The samples are being examined by state-run mineral company Rosgeologiya , and financed with funding from the federal government. While Russia has a history of coal mining on the islands since the s, both the company that manages the Russian presence in the region, Trust Arktikugol, and Russian and Western experts alike have been saying that the coal on Svalbard is running out.
Per Arne Totland, a journalist and expert on the region, believes it is natural for the Russians to consider other options in light of coal depletion. Moscow knows quite well how unlikely it is that oil drilling will be permitted at Svalbard. This is particularly bad news for the Russians, who have invested substantially over previous decades to stay there.
Arild Moe, a researcher at the Fritdjof Nansens Institute in Oslo, does not believe Russia is at risk of losing its claims though. Jorgen Holten Jorgensen, another Svalbard expert, said the Russian interest in resource exploitation on Svalbard is not related to economic profit as much as a reason to maintain a presence in the region.
During the s and s, Turkey pursued absolute gains via its signing of guest worker agreements with various European states, which served to reduce its unemployment and facilitate the flow of foreign exchange via remittances—all while also benefiting the economies of Western Europe. By — Turkey's relationship with European states had become more antagonistic as it attempted to leverage Europe's interest in stemming migration to secure substantial economic benefits Greenhill ; Adamson Migration diplomacy is a multifaceted process, both in terms of the actors involved and the strategies employed.
Migration diplomacy also involves linkages with other areas of states interests, including national and domestic security concerns, economic interests, and interests in promoting public diplomacy or other forms of enhancing a state's soft power. In terms of strategies, migration diplomacy can be approached as a zero-sum game by pursuing relative gains or as a positive-sum game in order to reach mutually beneficial outcomes. In this article we have presented a basic framework for thinking about the relationship between cross-border mobility, state power and interests, and interstate bargaining and diplomacy.
We have proposed a definition of and delineated the scope conditions for what constitutes migration diplomacy, as well as laying the groundwork for future theorizing and empirical study.
As such, the interests, linkages, and strategies identified here are not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. Further research is needed to identify the universe of cases that could be characterized as instances of migration diplomacy and to map out the diverse actors, interests, and processes that are engaged in pursuing immigration, emigration, and transit migration diplomacy.
In this regard, a key area for future research would be the conditions under which the migration diplomacy strategies of states are more or less effective. Clearly, a number of factors, including the differential levels of power and resources available to state actors, are areas that merit further examination. Finally, an additional set of questions that merits further research concerns the different mechanisms at play in instances of migration diplomacy. How applicable is a two-level game theory approach, for instance, in understanding international agreements on migration flows, and to what extent do sending, transit, and receiving states differ with regard to the mechanisms they use?
Under what conditions are states most likely to achieve their aims? And what are the determining factors that lead to zero-sum versus positive-sum approaches to interstate bargaining on migration issues? These are all important questions not just for theory, but also for formulating policies to address the migration issues that are increasingly at the forefront of the international political agenda.
There is a well-developed literature in political science and sociology on the domestic impacts of migration on states and on the evolution of state migration control and migrant integration policies. Yet, there is less understanding of the relationship between cross-border flows of people and the national interests and diplomatic strategies of states. Given the likelihood that migration will only increase in its importance to states and their policymakers in the next decades, there is plenty of room for further research on the international politics of global migration and mobility.
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Europe’s Growing Muslim Population
Sign In. Advanced Search. Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume Article Contents. Migration Diplomacy: Definitions and Scope Conditions. Issue Linkages and Types of Migration Diplomacy. Oxford Academic. Google Scholar. Gerasimos Tsourapas.
Cite Citation. Permissions Icon Permissions. In doing so, we build on the important work of Gabbacia , Greenhill , Oyen , Thiollet , and others who have noted the relationship between migration and various forms of state diplomacy. This is not to say that some insights gleaned from a focus on migration diplomacy would not be of interest for understanding the policies or actions of nonstate actors.
Indeed, we would expect that just as the literature on paradiplomacy has applied concepts of state diplomacy to nonstate actors, similar parallels could be found in the area of migration diplomacy and paradiplomacy.
For the purposes of our analysis, we are excluding processes and tools of population management that occur within empires Klotz For example, settler colonialism, in which states move citizens to a specific region following conquest, do not form part of migration diplomacy strategies, as they do not involve interstate negotiations.
Search ADS. Google Preview. Athens-Macedonian News Agency. Athens-Macedonian News Agency, August 3. Accessed September 25, Research Paper No. De Bel-Air. Accessed May 21, February 2. October Multiple Actors and Comparative Perspectives. September Accessed May 20, Migration Policy Institute. February 8. Accessed May 15, August Evidence from Egypt. United Nations. January Van Hear. World Bank. Issue Section:. Download all figures. View Metrics. Email alerts New issue alert.
Advance article alerts. Since early , the EU's overall economic prospects have improved, with a sustained economic recovery taking hold across most of the EU. Although some concerns exist about an unfavorable external environment amid growing trade tensions including with the United States , the European Commission predicts EU growth will remain resilient.
Some economic anxieties linger, however. Several EU countries continue to struggle with sluggish growth and high unemployment especially among young people in countries such as Spain and Italy. Although Greece received a degree of debt relief in June its eurozone creditors agreed to extend loan maturities due in by 10 years to ease Greece's repayment burden and officially exited its financial assistance program in August , Greece's economy remains fragile.
Austerity measures are still in place, the country faces a long road to a full economic recovery, and questions persist about the strength of Greece's banking system. Increasingly, some experts voice renewed concerns about financial stability in Italy, the eurozone's third-largest economy.
Following Italian elections in March , a new coalition government took office composed of two largely antiestablishment, populist parties that are critical of the EU and believe eurozone fiscal rules have constrained Italy's economic growth. In September , the Italian government unveiled a new budget for that rejects austerity measures and foresees significantly higher public spending. The European Commission has demanded that the Italian government revise its budget plans, but Italy has so far declined to do so and is expected to face EU disciplinary action for breaching EU fiscal rules.
Italy ultimately could face financial sanctions.
Some experts worry that this budget dispute could reignite investor concerns about Italy's debt sustainability and threaten the eurozone's integrity and stability again. Since the release of its budget, Italy's borrowing costs have risen and key credit rating agencies have downgraded Italy's debt rating. Over the last several years, many EU countries have seen a rise in support for populist, nationalist, antiestablishment political parties.
These parties are often termed "euroskeptic" because many have also been fueled by worries that too much national sovereignty has been relinquished to Brussels. Although not a completely new phenomenon in the EU, the uptick in support for such parties largely began in response to Europe's economic difficulties, austerity measures, and the eurozone crisis. For some voters, how Brussels handled the eurozone crisis renewed long-standing concerns about the EU's "democratic deficit"—a sense that ordinary citizens have little say in decisions taken in faraway Brussels.
Fears about globalization and a loss of European identity also have been factors in the growth in support for such parties. Populist and euroskeptic parties, however, are not monolithic. Most are on the far right of the political spectrum, but a few are on the left or far left. The degree of euroskepticism also varies widely among them, and they hold a range of views on the future of the EU.
While some advocate for EU reforms and a looser EU in which member states would retain greater sovereignty, others call for an end to the eurozone or even to the EU itself. A range of euroskeptic parties did well in the European Parliament elections see text box , and euroskeptic parties have made significant gains in national and local elections in some countries.
For example, parties with varying degrees of euroskeptic views lead the government or are part of coalition governments in Italy, Poland, Hungary, Austria, and Finland. In Denmark, a minority government relies on a euroskeptic party to provide parliamentary support. In Germany, the anti-immigrant and euroskeptic Alternative for Germany party secured enough support in federal elections in to enter parliament, becoming the first far-right German political party to do so since the end of World War II.
Such euroskeptic parties are challenging the generally pro-European establishment parties and have put pressure on mainstream leaders to embrace some of their positions. The UK government's decision to hold the June public referendum on continued EU membership was driven largely by pressure from hard-line euroskeptics, both within and outside of the governing Conservative Party.
Some euroskeptic parties may hope to influence the formation of EU policies and stem further EU integration. At the same time, opinion polls indicate that a majority of EU citizens remain supportive of the EU. Such parties, however, have struggled to form a cohesive opposition and are riddled with political divisions and different views on numerous issues including EU reforms.
Antiestablishment and euroskeptic Members of the European Parliament are spread among at least three political groups in the current European Parliament, and many analysts claim that euroskeptic parties have failed to exert significant influence. Atlhough some observers believe antiestablishment and euroskeptic parties may further increase their share of seats in the European Parliament elections due in May , it remains questionable whether these parties could form a more unified parliamentary force.
At the same time, experts suggest that more Members of Parliament from such parties could further fracture the parliament and threaten the status quo in which the parliament's mainstream center-right and center-left parties traditionally exert the most control and largely drive the legislative process. Historically, the development of the EU has been driven forward largely by several key countries acting as an "engine.
Many experts suggest, however, that a strong EU "engine" has been lacking over the last few years. Although German Chancellor Angela Merkel has played a central role in responding to the eurozone crisis, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the migrant and refugee flows, critics view her as being too hesitant and tactical in many instances, rather than acting as a leader of Europe writ large.
Other analysts argue that too much power in the EU has been concentrated in Germany alone, in part because leaders of other key European countries have been hindered by domestic politics and economic preoccupations. Many viewed this as crucial for the EU's future, especially in light of Brexit. Although Macron is a committed European integrationist and has proposed ambitious EU reforms, Merkel's tenure is drawing to a close. Now in her fourth term of office, Chancellor Merkel is increasingly facing domestic opposition and challenges to her authority, including from within her own center-right political grouping, amid growing tensions over migration and asylum policy.
In late October , Merkel announced she will step down as her party's leader in December and will not run for reelection in Various commentators contend that Merkel has been too constrained domestically to pursue significant new EU initiatives along the lines advocated for by Macron. Furthermore, some observers assert that European leaders do not have a robust or shared strategic vision for the EU. Those of this view point to what they consider to be ad hoc, piecemeal responses that eschew hard decisions about further integration or fail to address issues with an eye to ensuring a strong, stable, united, economically vibrant EU in the long term.
Differences also have emerged between Germany and France on certain aspects of key issues, including potential eurozone reforms and the future of EU defense policy. A number of analysts suggest that smaller EU members, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and the Baltic countries, are not keen to see a reinvigorated Franco-German engine in the absence of the UK, which often served as a check on more federalist impulses. Meanwhile, as noted above, Italy's current government harbors euroskeptic views and is considered unlikely to champion EU reforms.
Observers contend that the crises over Greece and migration have produced significant divisions, a high degree of acrimony, and a lack of trust among EU member states. Moreover, these crises threatened the core EU principle of solidarity. While horse-trading and protecting national interests have always been part of EU politicking, analysts assert that narrow national agendas are increasingly taking priority over European-wide solutions.
Some commentators also have begun to question the commitment of some European leaders and publics to the European integration project in light of demographic and generational changes. For younger Europeans, World War II and even the Cold War are far in the past, and some may not share the same conviction as previous generations about the need for a strong and united EU. Against this complex political and economic backdrop, the EU is grappling with several major challenges. Many observers contend that the breadth and difficulty of these multiple issues are unprecedented.
How the EU responds may have lasting implications not only for the EU itself, but also for its role as an international actor and as a key U. The UK has long been considered one of the most euroskeptic members of the EU, with many British leaders and citizens traditionally cautious of ceding too much sovereignty to Brussels. As a result, the UK chose to remain outside the eurozone and the Schengen free movement area, and it negotiated the right to participate in only selected justice and home affairs policies. Amid the challenges to the EU over the last few years, former UK Prime Minister David Cameron faced growing pressure from hard-line euroskeptics, both within his own Conservative Party and outside of it, to reconsider the UK's relationship with the EU.
In response, the Cameron government announced it would renegotiate the UK's membership conditions with the EU and hold an "in-or-out" public referendum on the UK's continued membership in the EU. In February , Cameron reached a deal with other EU governments on measures that sought to better guard British sovereignty and economic interests in the EU. As noted previously, UK voters decided in favor of a British exit from the EU or "Brexit" by a relatively narrow margin of Several factors heavily influenced this outcome, including economic dissatisfaction especially among older and middle- to lower-income voters , fears about globalization and immigration, and anti-elite and antiestablishment sentiments.
The "leave" campaign appears to have successfully capitalized on arguments that the UK would be better off if it were free from EU regulations and from the EU principle of free movement, which had led to high levels of immigration to the UK from other EU countries. The UK government, led by Prime Minister Theresa May, enacted the results of the referendum in March by invoking Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union—the so-called exit clause, which outlines procedures for a member state to leave the EU.
The invocation of Article 50 triggered a two-year period for withdrawal negotiations to be concluded. EU-UK negotiations on the UK's pending withdrawal, which is widely expected to occur in March , have been contentious. In December , the EU and the UK reached an agreement in principle covering main aspects of three priority withdrawal issues the Irish border, the rights of UK and EU citizens, and the financial settlement. The UK government and public remains largely divided on whether it wants a "hard" or "soft" Brexit. As such, and despite the December accord with the EU, fleshing out many of the details related to the UK's withdrawal—including on customs arrangements and trade relations—has proved difficult.
A key sticking point has been devising a "backstop" for Northern Ireland—a sort of insurance policy to guarantee there will be no "hard" land border with customs and security checks between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Although UK and EU officials have repeatedly pledged to avoid a hard border to protect the Northern Ireland peace process, reaching precise agreement on how a backstop would function has not been easy. The protracted negotiations have prompted fears of a "no deal" scenario in which the UK would "crash out" of the EU in March without settled arrangements in place.
In mid-November , UK and EU negotiators announced they had concluded a draft withdrawal agreement outlining the terms of the "divorce" and a draft political declaration setting out the broad contours of the future UK-EU relationship. The backstop arrangement in the draft withdrawal agreement essentially would keep all of the UK in a customs union with the EU with areas of deeper regulatory alignment between Northern Ireland and the EU pending agreement on a more preferable solution in the forthcoming negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship.
UK officials maintain that it will never be necessary to implement the backstop. EU leaders approved the withdrawal agreement and political declaration on November 25, but concerns are growing that Prime Minister May's government may not have sufficient votes to secure the necessary approval in the UK Parliament. The backstop and other elements of the draft withdrawal agreement face opposition from a diverse group of UK parliamentarians with varying concerns.
Some critics argue that the proposed withdrawal agreement ties the UK too closely to the EU and leaves the UK in a "half in, half out" situation where it will be forced to accept many EU rules without having a say in EU decisionmaking. Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionist Party DUP —which lends parliamentary support to May's minority government—and others worry that the potential backstop could ultimately threaten the constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom. Fears of a "no deal" scenario thus persist. Some observers view the EU as taking a tough line in Brexit negotiations—refusing to allow the UK to "cherrypick" the benefits of the EU without assuming the required obligations—in part to discourage other member states and euroskeptic publics from contemplating a break with the EU that would further fracture the bloc.
Although conventional wisdom holds that most EU countries are simply too small to "go it alone," some EU officials worry that Brexit could undermine the EU if it prompts other countries to demand special membership conditions or additional policy opt-outs. Other experts note that the considerable difficulties the UK is facing in pursuing Brexit have served as a cautionary tale for publics in other EU countries and contributed to increased support for the EU in most other member states.
EU leaders maintain that "the Union of 27 countries will continue," 15 but the departure of a member state is unprecedented in the EU's history. Brexit will have political and economic repercussions for both the UK and the EU. Along with Germany and France, the UK has long been viewed as one of the EU's "big three" and has served as a key driver of certain EU initiatives, especially EU efforts to forge more common foreign and security policies.
Some experts suggest that given the UK's foreign policy clout and defense capabilities, Brexit could diminish the EU's role as an international actor. At the working level, EU officials are aggrieved to be losing British personnel with significant technical expertise and negotiating prowess on issues such as sanctions and dealing with countries like Russia and Iran.
Brexit also might dampen prospects for further EU enlargement, in part because the UK had long been one of the staunchest supporters within the EU of continued expansion, including to Turkey. At the same time, some contend that Brexit could ultimately lead to a more like-minded EU, able to pursue deeper integration without UK opposition.
Muslim Population Growth in Europe | Pew Research Center
For example, Brexit could strengthen the prospects for closer EU defense cooperation because the UK traditionally served as a brake on certain measures in this area. Concerns have grown over the last few years about what many EU officials and observers view as democratic backsliding in some member states, particularly Poland and Hungary. EU leaders and civil society organizations have criticized both countries for passing laws and adopting policies that appear to conflict with basic EU values and democratic norms.
In Poland, EU concerns center on judicial and media reforms undertaken since by the ruling conservative-nationalist Law and Justice Party PiS that opponents charge increase government control over the courts and public broadcasters. Many observers contend that there has been a similar erosion of checks and balances in Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his conservative-nationalist Fidesz party. Since , Orban's dominant political position has allowed Fidesz to adopt a new national constitution and to reform state institutions in ways that critics argue have centralized power around the prime minister's office and have entrenched Fidesz as the dominant political party.
Many experts also assert that Orban and Fidesz increasingly are targeting media and civil society groups that oppose their policies. Both the Polish and the Hungarian governments largely dismiss EU criticisms of democratic backsliding in their countries, and both have defended their respective policies vociferously. In Poland, PiS maintains that judicial reforms were necessary to root out Communist-era judges and improve efficiency and that granting the government power to hire and fire management at public broadcasters has helped to correct political bias. In Hungary, supporters of Orban and Fidesz argue that constitutional and electoral reforms seek to address government corruption and mismanagement.
Government officials also note that public support for PiS in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary remains steady, citing this as an indication of their democratic legitimacy. Over the past year, however, EU concerns have continued to mount and both Poland and Hungary are now subject to Article 7 proceedings —an infringement process outlined in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union for member states accused of violating EU fundamental rights.
Ultimately, Article 7 could lead to a loss of a country's voting rights in the Council of Ministers. EU officials maintain that the goal of the Article 7 proceedings is not to sanction Poland or Hungary but rather to encourage dialogue and revisions to practices that pose concerns. Most EU officials and outside analysts view the prospects of either country actually losing its voting rights as highly unlikely, given that this would require unanimous agreement among all other EU member states and it is expected that Poland and Hungary would each block consensus for such action against the other.
News reports suggest that additional countries such as Bulgaria and the Czech Republic also would oppose suspending the voting rights of a fellow member state. In addition, EU officials have voiced concerns recently about the rule of law and corruption in Romania and Malta. The EU is currently debating its next seven-year budget, and the European Commission has proposed tying the disbursement of EU development and other assistance funds to member states' records in upholding the rule of law. Although some member states support doing so, others—including Poland and Hungary—are opposed.
Poland and Hungary bristle at what they see as EU interference in their national sovereignty, in part because they believe that member states have ceded too much sovereignty in certain areas to Brussels.
Both Poland and Hungary appear skeptical of further EU integration in some policy fields, such as migration, and charge that they are being unfairly targeted for their different views on the bloc's purpose and future shape. Hungarian officials, including Prime Minister Orban, also contend that the initiation of Article 7 proceedings is "Brussels' revenge" for Hungary's hard-line migration policies.
Other analysts contend that Poland and Hungary's apparent disregard for core EU values endangers the character of the union and undermines the trust among member states upon which the EU ultimately rests. Some criticize the EU for addressing rule-of-law concerns belatedly, especially with respect to Hungary. Others note that the EU has few options, as there is no mechanism for expelling a country from the EU. Over the last few years, Europe has experienced significant migrant and refugee flows as people have fled conflict and poverty in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere.
According to the United Nations, more than 1 million refugees and migrants reached Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea in , roughly , did so in , over , in , and over , thus far in Many refugees and migrants are eager to travel onward to northern EU member states. Germany and Sweden traditionally have been preferred final destinations due to their strong economies and perceptions that they are more likely to grant asylum and provide better welfare benefits.
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During the height of the migrant and refugee flows in , various EU initiatives to manage the crisis proved largely unsuccessful. In , the EU began to focus on discouraging people from undertaking the journey as a way to stem the flows and save lives. In March , EU leaders agreed to end the "wave-through approach" that was allowing individuals arriving in Greece primarily across the Eastern Mediterranean from Turkey to transit the Western Balkans to seek asylum in other EU countries.
At the same time, the EU also announced an agreement with Turkey to curtail the flows to Greece. Since these arrangements with Turkey and Libya went into effect, the number of migrants and refugees reaching Europe has decreased substantially. Nevertheless, the EU deals with both Turkey and Libya have been controversial, as human rights advocates charge they violate international law and the rights of refugees. The EU has faced considerable criticism for lacking coherent, effective migration and asylum policies, which have long been difficult to forge because of national sovereignty concerns and sensitivities about minorities, integration, and identity.
Despite the overall reduction in migrants and refugees currently seeking to enter Europe, the influxes continue to have significant political and societal ramifications for the EU. These include the following:. The EU continues to work on developing a more comprehensive migration and asylum policy and on measures to better manage both legal and irregular migration. However, progress has been slow, and many EU national governments face considerable domestic pressure for ever-stricter policies designed largely to curb continued and future migration.
A particularly contentious issue centers on revising the Dublin regulation. Proposed reforms to the Dublin regulation include a "fairness mechanism" to relieve some of the burden on frontline states facing heightened asylum pressures during times of increased migratory flows, as well as measures to curb secondary movements that can strain favored destination countries.
Various EU member states oppose different elements of the proposed Dublin regulation revisions, and agreement has proven elusive to date.